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Optimal Risk Adoption and Capacity Investment in
Technological Innovations
Lars H. Sendstad , Michail Chronopoulos , and Verena Hagspiel
Abstract—Technological innovations often formulate new mar-
ket regimes and create incentives to abandon existing, less at-
tractive ones. However, this decision depends not only on market
forces, such as economic and technological uncertainty, but also
on attitudes toward risk. Although greater risk aversion typically
raises the incentive to postpone investment, the impact of risk
aversion becomes more complex when a firm has discretion over
both the timing and the size of a project. We develop a utility-based
regime-switching framework in order to analyze how a firm with
discretion over investment timing and project scale may choose
to abandon an existing market regime to enter a new one. Results
indicate that greater risk aversion hastens investment in an existing
regime by decreasing the amount of installed capacity, but delays
its abandonment, thereby hindering the transition to a new one.
In contrast, greater demand uncertainty in the new market regime
raises the value of the investment opportunity and, in turn, the
incentive to abandon the existing regime. Furthermore, we find
that uncertainty over the arrival of a technological innovation may
accelerate investment in the existing regime and reduce the relative
loss in project value in the absence of managerial discretion over
project scale.
Index Terms—Investment analysis, real options, regime
switching, risk aversion, technological innovation.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN THE past few decades, the rapid pace of innovationand intense research and development (R&D) activities in
many industries, such as information technologies, renewable
energy (RE), and telecommunications, has resulted in several
technological innovations. Examples include the major change
that the photography industry underwent in the 1990s, when the
traditional film was replaced by digital photography. Kodak, one
of the major market players in the USA for traditional film, failed
to keep up with many of the innovations brought by the digital
era. As digital cameras became popular and reduced the need
for photographic film, Kodak filed for bankruptcy in 2012 [37].
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Similarly, Nokia’s slow reaction to adopting prominent mobile
software and positioning itself strategically next to Apple and
Samsung led to a decline in profits. However, through a strategic
sale of its failing handset business, Nokia acquired sufficient
capital to pivot into the network equipment industry through
several major acquisitions [38].
Similarly, in the energy sector, RE technologies are rapidly es-
tablishing a presence in the energy market and are becoming less
reliant upon heavy subsidies or other policy interventions [40].
This green growth is transforming energy markets throughout
the world and has led many companies to alter their investment
strategies, drastically. For example, Scottish Power, one of the
big six U.K. energy firms, has recently decided to completely
abandon fossil fuels in favor of wind power [25]. Also, Ørsted, a
Danish energy company that was operating in dwindling North
sea fields for oil and gas with ailing connected gas and coal
power plants, shed all its fossil fuel assets and used the proceeds
to enter the RE industry through wind farm investments [39].
The aforementioned examples illustrate how timely technol-
ogy switch is key for corporate strategy, as it may determine
the success or failure of a company as a whole in any industry
that is subject to a rapid pace of innovation. However, this
decision becomes rather complex when it entails irreversible
capacity investment in the light of evolving uncertainties and risk
aversion. Indeed, although an early transition to a new market
regime allows a firm to limit its exposure to downside risk from
remaining in a declining old market, waiting enables the firm
to observe the market and make a more informed irreversible
capacity investment decision.
By analyzing this tradeoff, our contribution to the existing
literature is threefold.
1) We develop a utility-based regime-switching framework
for analyzing the decision to invest in and subsequently
abandon the existing regime due to the arrival of a tech-
nological innovation;
2) We show how attitudes toward risk as well as economic
and technological uncertainty impact the optimal regime-
switching strategy in terms of both the optimal investment
and capacity-sizing decision. Specifically, we find that risk
aversion accelerates investment by raising the incentive
to build a smaller project, while greater price sensitivity
to project scale lowers the amount of installed capacity,
thereby decreasing the incentive to abandon an existing
market regime. Furthermore, we find that greater demand
uncertainty in the existing (new) regime lowers (raises)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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the incentive to abandon the existing regime in order to
invest in the new one.
3) We provide managerial insights for investment decisions
based on analytical and numerical results.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. We pro-
ceed by discussing some related work in Section II and in-
troduce assumptions and notation in Section III. The prob-
lem of investment in a new market regime is addressed
in Section IV-A. In Section IV-B, we tackle the problem of
abandoning an old regime in order to invest in a new one, and
in Section IV-C, we analyze the problem of optimal investment
and capacity sizing under regime switching. Section V provides
numerical examples for each case. Finally, Section VI concludes
this article.
II. RELATED WORK
Real options theory accounts for decision making under un-
certainty while reflecting the flexibility from embedded man-
agerial discretion. Therefore, it has been widely adopted for
analyzing problems such as the optimal entry to and exit from
a project. However, formulations of these problems have been
mainly developed under the assumption of complete financial
markets or a risk-neutral decision maker [14], [30], [31]. Such
formulations are not pertinent to analyzing investment in tech-
nological innovations, since these often entail idiosyncratic risk
that cannot be diversified, and therefore, decision makers may
exhibit risk aversion. Indeed, the underlying commodities of
such projects are not likely to be freely traded, which prevents the
construction of a replicating portfolio. In turn, the assumption of
hedging via spanning assets breaks down and a contingent-claim
approach cannot be used for project and option valuation. Hence,
analytical methods for capital budgeting and risk assessment
must be developed via dynamic programming, which uses a
subjective discount rate to maximize the expected discounted
utility of the profits of a risk-averse decision maker.
Examples of early work that attempts to reconcile risk aver-
sion with real options theory but ignores regime switching
include [21], in which Henderson and Hobson extend the work
of Merton [32] by introducing market incompleteness via the
inclusion of a risky asset on which no trading is allowed. In
the same line of work, Henderson [20] assumes that a risky
asset that is correlated with the investment payoff can be used to
hedge only part of the uncertainty associated with the investment
payoff, so that the remaining risk is idiosyncratic. Results indi-
cate that higher risk aversion or lower correlation between the
project value and the hedging asset, i.e., greater idiosyncratic
risk, lowers both the option value and the investment thresh-
old. This happens because the decision maker wants to reduce
uncertainty by locking-in a value for the investment payoff.
By contrast, Hugonnier and Morellec [22] account for a de-
cision maker’s risk aversion via a constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility function and show that risk aversion erodes the
value of a project and raises the required investment threshold.
Extensions in the same line of work that allow for operational
flexibility and discretion over project scale are presented in [6]
and [7].
Regime-switching frameworks for investment under eco-
nomic uncertainty that allow for attitudes toward risk but ignore
Markov switching and discretion over project scale include [1]
and [2]. These frameworks assume that the structure of the
underlying stochastic process may be affected by either a change
in volatility while holding the drift fixed (see [2]) or a change in
drift while holding the volatility constant (see [1]). Their results
challenge those of the traditional real options literature by show-
ing how increasing uncertainty does not necessarily decelerate
investment. An extension of [1] and [2] that considers a structural
change of the underlying stochastic process in terms of both
the drift and the volatility is presented in [28]. More recently,
Chronopoulos and Lumbreras [8] have developed a Markov
regime-switching model for investment under uncertainty and
find that, depending on market-regime asymmetry, greater risk
aversion and price uncertainty in a new regime may accelerate
regime switching. However, their model assumes an exogenous
price process and ignores the flexibility to scale the size of a
project.
In the area of investment and capacity sizing, examples of
early work include [13] and [33]. The former considers a firm
that expands its capital stock incrementally with operational
flexibility, while the latter allows for discrete capacity sizing
and develops a model for choosing among mutually exclusive
projects under uncertainty. The decision rule of [13] involves:
1) ranking the projects by capacity; 2) finding the investment
threshold for each project; and 3) selecting the largest project
for which the optimal threshold exceeds the current price. In
the same line of work, Dangl [11] tackles the problem of
investing in a project with continuously scalable capacity and
finds that demand uncertainty raises the optimal capacity and
makes waiting the optimal strategy even when demand is high.
Another extension of [13] is presented by Décamps et al. [12],
who identify a second waiting region around the indifference
point between the net present values (NPVs) of two projects.
Within this region, a firm will select the smaller (larger) project
if the price drops (increases) sufficiently. Applications of these
models to RE investment are presented in [5] and [16], while
policy-oriented applications are described in [3] and [35]. Nev-
ertheless, these models are based on the assumption of risk
neutrality, and therefore, attitudes toward risk are not taken into
account.
Within the context of investment in technological innovations,
Hagspiel et al. [19] consider a risk-neutral price-setting firm that
faces both technological change and a declining profit stream.
The firm can abandon an established technology by either exiting
the corresponding market regime permanently or by investing in
a new one. However, the new regime is assumed to be available,
and therefore, technological uncertainty is not considered. Their
results indicate that, with (without) discretion over capacity,
the relationship between the optimal investment threshold and
economic uncertainty is monotonic (nonmonotonic). In addi-
tion, they find that the firm abandons the current regime more
easily when economic uncertainty is high and when the market
for the innovative product is very attractive. Considering the
case of electric vehicles, Lukas et al. [27] study the impact of
uncertainty over the technological life cycle on the decision to
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
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invest and scale the capacity of a project under risk neutrality.
They find that the investment threshold follows an S-curve,
segmented with respect to the optimal capacity choice, which
depends on the degree of product life-cycle uncertainty. Filom-
ena et al. [15] analyze the problem of technology selection and
capacity investment for electricity generation in a competitive
environment under uncertainty, considering: 1) the portfolio of
technologies; 2) each technology’s capacity; and 3) the tech-
nology’s production level for every scenario. Results indicate
that portfolio diversification arises even with risk-neutral firms
and technologies with different cost expectations. Using plug-in
electric vehicles as an example, Kauppinen et al. [26] analyze
the impact of multiple sources of uncertainty on a sequential
investment decision and show that lower growth rate might
induce earlier investment when the time to build is relatively
long.
Since attitudes toward risk and discretion over both invest-
ment timing and project scale may impact the optimal investment
policy significantly, we explore their interaction and combined
impact in this article. The scope of our model does not include
the option to choose between alternative technologies (market
regimes) as in [18]. Instead, we emphasize on how demand and
technological uncertainty interact to affect the decision to invest
in an established market regime and subsequently abandon it
in order to enter a new one. Specifically, our work builds upon
and complements the framework of [8] and [19]. In [19], it is
shown how higher profitability of a new technology increases
the incentive to adopt it earlier but invest in smaller capacity.
However, in our setting, a more profitable new technology leads
to earlier adoption yet with a higher capacity. In addition, we
allow for risk aversion and technological uncertainty and find
that both greater risk aversion and innovation rate accelerate
technology adoption. Also, the latter demonstrates how greater
price uncertainty and risk aversion may impact the timing of a
regime switch, but ignore how capacity sizing decisions may
be affected. Indeed, most of the results are reversed since a
risk-averse firm can control its risk exposure via capacity sizing.
Consequently, the contribution to this line of work is driven by
the interaction between risk aversion and discretion over project
scale under demand and technological uncertainty, features that
are considered separately in the existing literature. Additionally,
our framework offers a methodological contribution to the liter-
ature that addresses the impact of risk aversion on capacity in-
vestment via a utility-based framework assuming a price-taking
firm, i.e., an exogenous price process, thus ignoring the feedback
effect of capacity expansion on the optimal capacity investment
policy.
By incorporating attitudes toward risk via a hyperbolic ab-
solute risk aversion (HARA) utility function, we find that the
interaction between demand and technological uncertainty is
rather strong and that market regime asymmetry can impact the
decision to abandon an existing regime in order to switch to a
new one, considerably. Specifically, we find that greater (lower)
economic uncertainty in the new market regime raises (reduces)
the value of the associated investment opportunity and increases
(decreases) the incentive to abandon the existing market regime.
However, greater economic uncertainty in the existing regime
raises the value of waiting, thereby increasing the incentive to
postpone abandonment and delaying entry in the new regime.
Furthermore, we show how greater likelihood of a technological
innovation lowers the relative loss in value due to an incorrect
capacity choice.
III. MODEL SETUP
We consider a firm with a perpetual option to invest in a project
of infinite lifetime facing demand and technological uncertainty.
The firm has discretion over both the time of investment and the
size of the project and faces a multiplicative inverse demand
function [19], [23], [36]. Thus, the price process {P (k)t , t ≥ 0},
where t denotes time, depends not only on the demand shock
process {Θ(k)t , t ≥ 0}, but also on the output Qt. This relation-











t (1− ηQt) . (1)
where η is a positive constant reflecting the responsiveness
of price to project scale, and k = 1, 2, 3 are different market
regimes. In terms of context, η should generally be considered
regime dependent; however, if the firm is using an innovative
technology in the same market, η would be constant across
regimes. This would be the case, for example, with offshore wind
and oil production if both production technologies supplied the
same energy market.
The demand shock process follows a Markov-modulated ge-









0 ≡ Θ > 0 (2)
where μk > 0 denotes the annual growth rate, σk is the annual
volatility, and dZt is the increment of the standard Brownian
motion.
We assume that the arrival of a technological innovation
follows a Poisson process {Nt, t ≥ 0} with intensity ν that is
independent of {Θ(k)t , t ≥ 0}. This is particularly relevant for
firms that do not engage in R&D but invest in technologies
developed by R&D companies (as the firm under consideration
in this article) and want to assess the viability of an investment
decision with limited information about the decisions made by
R&D companies. Once an innovation takes place, two things
happen: 1) Regime 3 emerges; and 2) the market parameters
for the existing technology switch from Regime 1 to Regime 2.
We assume that the emergence of a new market regime reduces
the attractiveness of the existing one so that μ3 > μ1 > μ2.1
Note that the volatility can vary among the different regimes.
Although technological breakthroughs tend to reduce the attrac-
tiveness of mature technologies, the volatility associated with
the new market regime may initially be higher than that in the
existing regime. Similarly, the gradual deterioration of Regime 1
following the arrival of the new technology may be either steady
or volatile. Therefore, we do not pose any particular restriction
1We consider the profitability in each regime to be known, and hence, we do
not consider the potential to learn as time passes by Thijssen and Bregantini
[41].
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Fig. 1. State-transition diagram.





and σ2 ≷ σ1.
The scenario we analyze in this article is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Here, the firm initially holds the option to invest in Regime 1,
and upon exercising the option at the critical threshold Θ(1)τ1 ,
it receives the expected utility of the active project in Regime
1. Once an innovation occurs, market parameter values for the
existing technology switch from Regime 1 to Regime 2, while a
new market regime emerges. The firm abandons the old market
at the critical threshold Θ(2)τ0 and receives the option to enter
Regime 3.2 Note that the irreversibility of the decision to invest in
or abandon a market regime combined with demand uncertainty
creates the incentive for the firm to wait for demand uncertainty
to resolve by accruing relevant information before making an
irreversible decision.
The firm’s preferences are described by a functional U(·)
taken from the HARA class of utility functions, namely, a power




P γt . (3)
However, note that our framework can accommodate a wide
range of utility functions, such as a constant absolute risk aver-
sion and a CRRA utility function.
The operating cost is fixed and denoted by c ($/unit), and the
cost of abandoning the existing regime is fixed and denoted by
E ($) [4]. In contrast, the investment cost I(·) ($) is a linear
function of the capacity, indicated as
I(k) (Q) = b(k)Q (4)
where b(k) is constant. In line with [23], we assume that the
firm always produces at full capacity, Q. This is often referred
to as the clearance assumption and arises when it is costly to
ramp up and down capacity or when commitments to workers
and suppliers hinders temporary adjustments [19]. For ease of
exposition, we set I(k)(Q) ≡ I(k).
Also, we let i = 0, 1 denote the state of the project (technol-
ogy) in terms of being active (i = 1) or abandoned (i = 0). We let
τ
(k)
i denote the optimal time of investment or abandonment of a
technology in Regime k, Θ(k)τi denote the corresponding optimal
investment threshold, and Q(k) denote the optimal capacity.
Also, F (k)τi (·) is the maximized expected value of the option
to invest in or abandon a regime and Φ(k)τi (·) is the maximized
2The option to make a gradual transition from the old to the new market regime
instead of a direct abandonment of the old regime may also be considered within
the same framework, but it is not within the scope of this article.
expected utility of the active project in Regime k. For example,
the time of investment in Regime 1 is denoted by τ (1)1 , and
the corresponding optimal investment threshold and optimal




The value function within each market regime is determined
via backward induction, and the optimal investment policy in
each state is formulated by adopting a nested optimal stopping
time approach. Therefore, we begin by assuming that, after
having just exited the second regime, the firm is in an inactive
state and considers investing in the third one. Note that the
utility function in (3) is not separable in Pt, and therefore,
following the same approach as [10] and [22], the key insight is
to decompose the cash flows of the project into disjoint time
intervals, as illustrated in Fig. 2. Therefore, we assume that
the capital required for the realization of the project is initially
invested in a risk-free asset, e.g., a certificate of deposit, and
earns a risk-free rate, r, up to time τ (3)1 . At time τ
(3)
1 , the firm
swaps the risk-free cash flow for the risky cash flow that the
project generates and fixes the capacity of the project. We assume
that the operating cost is 0 in Regime 3.3 Also, we denote by
ρ and r the subjective and risk-free discount rate, respectively,
and assume that both discount rates are greater than μk.4 The
objective is to determine the investment policy that maximizes
the time-zero expected discounted utility of all the cash flows of



























where EΘ[·] denotes the expectation operator conditional on the
initial value of the demand shock parameter, Θ.
By decomposing the first integral in (5) and rewriting it as
in (6), we note that the first term in (6) is deterministic, and
therefore, the optimization objective is reflected in the second
3This can be motivated by the operation and maintenance costs of RE such
as offshore wind investments, which are only about 15% of the levelized cost of
energy, i.e., total cost [24].
4This assumption is required in order to ensure the convergence of the firm’s
value functions [14, p. 138].
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Next, we rewrite the second term in (6) as in (7) using the law
of iterated expectations and the strong Markov property of the
GBM. The latter states that the values of the price process after
time τ (3)1 are independent of the values before τ
(3)
1 and depend
only on the value of the process at the time of investment in
Regime 3, τ (3)1 . The objective is to determine the first passage
time τ (3)1 of the demand shock parameter through the threshold
Θ
(3)
τ1 , i.e., τ
(3)
1 = inf{t > 0 : Θt ≥ Θ(3)τ1 }.
F
(3)

































Note that the inner conditional expectation’s independence from
Θ
(3)
τ1 ) means that the two expectations in (7) may be sepa-
rated, as indicated in (8). Hence, the firm’s maximized value
of investment opportunity is expressed in (8) as the product
of the stochastic discount factor (first term) and Φ(3)1 (Θ
(3)
τ1 ),
which denotes the expected utility of the project’s cash flows
maximized with respect to capacity (second term), i.e.,
F
(3)

















As shown in Proposition 1, it is possible to derive the analyt-
ical expression for the expected utility of a perpetual stream
of cash flows when the demand shock parameter follows a
Markov-modulated GBM. In turn, this facilitates insights on
how attitudes toward risk impact the expected utility of a project
within a regime-switching environment and enables the anal-
ysis of the feedback effect of capacity choice on price under
risk aversion. This is a critical contribution to the real options
literature for capacity investment under risk aversion [7] that
typically assumes an exogenous price process, and, therefore,
ignores the feedback effect of project scale on the output price.
Indeed, when considering how greater economic uncertainty
raises the required investment threshold and, in turn, the amount
of installed capacity [11], it is crucial to account for the impact
of capacity on the output price, particularly when the former
increases to considerably high levels.






t , where Θ
(k)



























(ρ+ ν1k=1) (γ − β1k) (γ − β2k)
and 1k=1 is an indicator function, while βjk are the roots
of the quadratic 12σ
2
kβ(β − 1) + μkβ − (ρ+ ν1k=1) = 0, j =
1, 2 and k = 1, 2, 3.
Note that at time τ (3)1 , the firm exercises the investment
option and must determine the optimal size of the project for
the corresponding level of the demand shock parameter Θ(3)τ1 .
Hence, the objective of the firm when exercising its investment



























By applying the first-order necessary condition (FONC) to the
unconstrained optimization problem (9), we obtain the condition
for the optimal capacity. The optimal capacity for a given output










By setting γ = 1, we can derive the analytical expression for the



















Next, we assume that the demand shock parameter is too low to
justify immediate investment, and therefore, the firm needs to
wait until it hits a sufficiently high threshold. Note that we can
write the stochastic discount factor as EΘ[e−ρτ
(k)





[14], where βjk is the positive (β1k) or negative (β2k) root of
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the quadratic 12σ
2β(β − 1) + μβ − (ρ+ ν1k=1) = 0. There-
fore, F (3)1 (Θ) can be expressed, for Θ < Θ
(3)
τ1 , as follows:
F
(3)



















By applying the FONC to the unconstrained optimization
problem (12), we obtain the expression for the optimal in-
vestment threshold that is indicated in (13). Next, by inserting
(13) into (10), we derive the analytical expression for optimal
capacity, as indicated in (14). Note that, under risk neutrality,
(13) and (14) simplify the analytical solution for the optimal
investment threshold and optimal capacity described in [23].
Note that η only impacts the optimal capacity as a scaling factor
in Regime 3, as we will see in the numerical results; however,
the optimal investment threshold is unaffected. Hence, allowing
η to be different in Regime 3 from the other regimes would only
shift the value of the option to invest in the third regime. Hence,
in order to limit the number of moving parts in this model, we
have decided to keep η fixed across regimes.
Proposition 2: Under a HARA utility function, the optimal














Given that investment decisions are often based on the NPV
criterion, it is interesting to compare the expression of the
optimal capacity in (14) with that of a now-or-never investment
opportunity in (11). Note that parameter b is absent in (14),
which implies that the firm uses the additional degree of freedom
in investment timing to account for more expensive projects.
Furthermore, the impact of η is cut in half, when the firm has
discretion over timing. Intuitively, the firm can mitigate the
impact of greater demand sensitivity by adjusting the investment
timing. Also, the second-order sufficiency condition (SOSC)
requires the objective function to be concave at Θ(3)τ1 , which
is shown in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: The objective function F (3)1 (·) is strictly con-
cave at Θ(3)τ1 iff γ < β13.
In Proposition 4, we show that higher risk aversion decreases
the propensity to invest in greater capacity. Intuitively, risk
aversion decreases the expected utility of the project, which
makes a smaller capacity optimal. Hence, measures to reduce
the overall risk are crucial to induce investments in RE capacity.
For example, adequate financial markets to hedge price risk can
limit the effect of risk aversion [29].
Proposition 4: Greater risk aversion lowers the optimal ca-
pacity and decreases the required investment threshold.
In Proposition 5, we show that greater demand uncertainty
increases both the optimal capacity and the required investment
threshold. Intuitively, the firm mitigates demand uncertainty by
deferring the irreversible investment decision in order to learn
more about future market conditions.
Proposition 5: Greater demand uncertainty raises the optimal
capacity and increases the required investment threshold.
B. Regime 2
Here, we assume that the firm is active in Regime 2 and that
it holds an embedded option to abandon it in order to invest in
Regime 3. Note that when the firm decides to abandon the second
regime, it salvages the operating cost, incurs the abandonment
cost, and foregoes the revenues of the active project. Also, since
the project is already active in Regime 2, the capacity may have
already been set optimally either in Regime 1 or Regime 2,
depending on whether an innovation occurred before the firm
could invest or after. Assuming that the capacity was fixed upon
investment in Regime 1 and cannot be adjusted ex-post, the
expected utility of an abandoned project is described in (15)
and consists of the expected utility of abandoning the second































Following the same steps as in Section IV-A, the maximized
value of the option to abandon the second regime is described
in (16) for Θ > Θ(2)τ0 , as a product of the stochastic discount
factor and the expected NPV at abandonment. Note that, in the
presence of the embedded option to invest in Regime 3, the





























Next, we step back and assume that the firm is active in the
second regime and holds the option to abandon it following a
sufficient decrease in demand. The expected utility of the active






























To emphasize the value of the option to invest in the third
regime, we also determine the value of the option to abandon
the second one permanently, which is indicated in (18) and we
use overbar to differentiate this case. This implies that we are
calculating the scenario without Regime 3, meaning that the
impact of F (3)1 (Θ
(2)
τ0
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In the absence of the option to invest in Regime 3, we can obtain
an analytical expression for the optimal abandonment threshold.
An increase in the demand parameters η raises the optimal aban-
donment threshold. Intuitively, this occurs because an increase in
ηmakes the inverse demand function more responsive to changes
in capacity. Thus, greater η lowers the output price for a given
capacity and, in turn, reduces the attractiveness of the second
regime, thereby inducing earlier abandonment. This reveals an
important testable hypotheses, since a greater η implies a smaller
overall market, in which firms might be expected to abandon and

















For completeness, we also consider the case where a tech-
nological innovation occurs before the firm enters the market;
however, due to lower costs associated with the old market, the
firm considers to invest in Regime 2. The first-order condition

































With the option to delay investment, the maximized value of the
option to invest in Regime 2 is described in (21) for Θ < Θ(2)τ1 .
Unlike Regime 3, the optimal investment threshold is now ob-
tained numerically by applying the FONC to the unconstrained











































The required investment threshold balances two opposing
forces. On the one hand, greater demand uncertainty increases
the incentive to wait and to invest later, whereas, on the other
hand, the value of the option to abandon also increases, which,
in turn, increases the project value and incentivizes early invest-
ment.
C. Regime 1
To facilitate the analysis of technological uncertainty, we
derive the value functions and optimal investment thresholds
in Regime 1 as the solution to a free-boundary problem. The
expected utility of the active project in the first regime is
indicated in (22) for Θ > Θ(2)τ0 . The first and second terms
on the right-hand side are the utility of the immediate profits
and the second term is the expected utility in the continuation
region. As the second term indicates, within an infinitesimal
time interval dt, a regime switch may take place with probability
νdt and the firm will receive the value function Φ(2)1 (Θ, Q
(1)),
which is already defined in (17) and consists of the value of
the active project in Regime 2 and a single embedded option to
abandon it. In contrast, no innovation will occur with probability
































1 (Θ + dΘ)
]}
,Θ > Θ(2)τ0 .
(22)
If Θ < Θ(2)τ0 , then, upon switching to the second regime, the
firm will terminate operations, thus receiving the cash flows
following the termination of operations in Regime 2 as well as
the option to invest in the third regime, as indicated in (15)
Φ
(1)























1 (Θ + dΘ)
]}
, Θ ≤ Θ(2)τ0 .
(23)
Expanding the right-hand side of (22) and (23) using Ito’s
lemma, we obtain the following ordinary differential equation:




∂Θ is the differential operator.
The solution for (24) shown at the bottom of this page, is
indicated in (25), as shown at bottom of the next page, where
β11 and β21 are the roots of 12σ
2
1β(β − 1) + μ1β − (ρ+ ν) = 0
and Cik = −ν/[ 12σ21βik(βik− 1) + μ1βik − (ρ+ ν)]. The first
two terms in the top part of (25) represent the expected profit
from operating in the first regime that might suddenly switch
to the second. The third term reflects abandonment option
from Regime 2, which is adjusted by the final term in order
to account for the likelihood of falling below the investment
threshold under technological uncertainty. The first three terms
on the bottom part represents the expected utility of the profits
from operating in the first regime, while the fourth term is the
{








1− ηQ(1))Q(1))− U (cQ(1) + rI(1)) = 0








1− ηQ(1))Q(1))− U (cQ(1) + rI(1)) = 0 (24)
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expected utility of the cash flows from abandoning Regime 2,
adjusted for technological uncertainty. The fourth term is the
option to invest in Regime 3, adjusted via the fifth term because
the second regime has yet to become available. If ν = 0, then
the third, fourth, and fifth terms in the upper branch are zero.
Intuitively, ν = 0 implies that no regime switching will take
place, and as a result, the first technology will continue to







(2)) since limν→∞ νA(1) = 1 and limν→∞ A(1) = 0
The condition for optimal capacity choice at investment in



























C22F (2)0 (Θ, Q(1)) +A(1)1 Θβ21
)
= 0 (26)
Note that if the firm invests in the first regime, then it needs
to consider not only how to maximize the profit in the first
regime, but also take into consideration the implications of the
installed capacity in a potentially declining market (Regime 2).
Intuitively, we expect to see that the firm installs a smaller project
to limit its risk exposure when a technological innovation in
likely to arrive.
Next, the dynamics of the option to invest in the first regime
are described as follows:
F
(1)













1 (Θ + dΘ)
]}
. (27)
The first term on the right-hand side of (27) indicates that, while
waiting to invest in the first regime, an innovation may take place
with probability νdt and the firm will receive the value function
F
(2)
1 (Θ). In contrast, with probability1− νdtno innovation will




By expanding the right-hand side of (27) using Itô’s lemma
we obtain (28), which must be solved together with (29), i.e.,
the differential equation for the value of the option to abandon
in the second regime
[L − (ρ+ ν)]F (1)1 (Θ) + νF (2)1 (Θ) = 0 (28)
[L − ρ]F (2)1 (Θ) = 0. (29)
Hence, the value of the option to invest in Regime 1 is obtained








β11 + C12A(2)1 Θβ12 , Θ < Θ(1)τ1
Φ
(1)
1 (Θ) , Θ ≥ Θ(1)τ1
. (30)





(1), Θ(1)τ1 , and Θ
(2)
τ0 are obtained
numerically via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
between the two branches of (25), (26), and (30).
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Regime 3







= 100, r = ρ = 10%, σk = 0.25, γ ∈
[0.9, 1.1], μ1 = 0%, μ2 = −2%, μ3 = 2%, ν = 0.1, Θ = 30,
E = 10, and c = 1. Also, we assume that a new regime (tech-
nology) is more attractive in that it exhibits a higher growth rate
compared to the incumbent one, yet entry entails a greater capital
expenditure. In terms of context, a firm may have an oil platform
that can be retrofitted to an offshore wind farm. This example fits
within the general setting, where a firm develops a facility using
an existing technology holding an embedded option to switch
to a new one following a market regime switch that renders the
latter more profitable. The irreversibility of the initial investment
decision is reflected on both the associated sunk investment cost
and the decommissioning cost that the firm must incur.
The left panel in Fig. 3 illustrates the option and project value
as well as the maximized NPV for μ3 = 1%, 2%, while the
right panel illustrates the impact of γ on Θ(3)τ1 for γ < 1 (risk
aversion),γ = 1 (risk-neutrality) andγ > 1 (risk-seeking). Note
that an increase in μ3 raises the attractiveness of Regime 3 and,
in turn, the incentive to install a bigger project, also decreasing
the required investment threshold. As the right panel illustrates,
greater risk-aversion accelerates investment by increasing the
firm’s incentive to build a smaller project, and, thus, reduce
exposure to downside risk, as shown in Proposition 4. This
is in direct contrast to [8] and happens because a more risk-
averse firm chooses a lower capacity instead of postponing the
investment decision to reduce the overall risk exposure. Also,
higher demand uncertainty postpones investment by raising the
associated opportunity cost and, in turn, the value of waiting.
Note that the association between the time of investment and
the optimal price threshold is based on the property of the GBM
with positive drift that indicates that the output price is expected
to increase on average with time. Thus, when an investment is
delayed or accelerated, the associated output price is on average







1 + νA(2)]A(1)U (Θ (1− ηQ(1))Q(1))− 1ρU (cQ(1) + rI(1))
+C22F (2)0 (Θ, Q(1)) +A(1)1 Θβ21 , Θ > Θ(2)τ0[
1− νA(2)]A(1)U (Θ (1− ηQ(1))Q(1))− 1ρ+νU (cQ(1) + rI(1))
+
νU(cQ(1)−rE)
ρ(ν+ρ) + C13F (3)1 (Θ) +B(1)1 Θβ11 , Θ ≤ Θ(2)τ0
. (25)
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Fig. 3. Impact of μ3 on option and project value where γ = 1 (left panel) and optimal investment threshold versus γ (right panel).
Fig. 4. Optimal capacity versus γ for η = 0.05 (left panel) and versus η (right panel).
In line with Fig. 3, the left panel of Fig. 4 indicates that it is op-
timal to invest in a smaller capacity when risk aversion increases,
while greater demand uncertainty raises the incentive to wait
and invest later in a bigger project. However, as the right panel
illustrates, greater η increases the price sensitivity to project
scale and leads to the installation of a smaller project, thereby
making the impact of greater risk aversion more pronounced.
This implies that both risk aversion and price sensitivity to
project scale present significant forces that can deter a bold entry
to a new market and emphasizes how managerial decisions are
subject to both internal, e.g., attitudes toward risk, and external
pressures reflected in the wider economic environment.
B. Regime 2
In Regime 2, a technological innovation has already altered
the market, which means that the market outlook for the first
technology is deteriorating. The left panel in Fig. 5 illustrates
the impact of η and σ2 on the optimal abandonment threshold.
Note that a lower η implies that prices are less affected by
additional capacity, which, in turn, leads to the installation of a
bigger project. However, an increase in the amount of installed
capacity raises the exposure to downside risk and, in turn, the
incentive to abandon the project at a higher threshold. Further-
more, greater demand uncertainty in Regime 2 increases the
incentive to postpone the abandonment decision. Intuitively, this
happens because the firm would be reluctant to abandon Regime
2 permanently due to a temporary downturn, which is more likely
when uncertainty is high. However, as the right panel indicates,
an increase in demand uncertainty in Regime 3 presents and
opposing force, as it raises the value of the associated investment
option and, in turn, the option to abandon Regime 2. However,
this is irrelevant if the option to invest in Regime 3 is not present,
as illustrated by the permanent abandonment threshold.
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Fig. 5. Optimal abandonment threshold versus γ (left panel) and σ3 (right panel).
Fig. 6. Impact of ν and γ on optimal investment threshold (left panel) and optimal capacity (right panel) in Regime 1.
C. Regime 1
Fig. 6 illustrates the impact of ν and γ on the optimal invest-
ment threshold (left panel) and the optimal capacity (right panel)
in Regimes 1 and 2. As the left panel indicates, greater likelihood
of regime switching raises a firm’s incentive to postpone invest-
ment in the first regime. Interestingly, although a nonmonotonic
impact is reported in earlier literature [9], this is not particularly
evident here, especially for high levels of risk aversion. Interest-
ingly, greater likelihood of regime switching does not raise the
amount of installed capacity, even though it raises the optimal
investment threshold, but, instead, results in the installation of a
smaller project. This seemingly counterintuitive result happens
because the emergence of a new market regime reduces the
attractiveness of the existing one, thereby raising the incentive
to invest later in a smaller project in Regime 1. Intuitively, the
firm would not want to commit to a project of large capacity
that is based on a technology that will soon become obsolete.
In order to establish further the intuition underlying this result,
notice also how both the optimal investment threshold and the
optimal capacity in Regime 1 converge under greater ν to their
values in Regime 2, where a regime switch has already taken
place.
Fig. 7 illustrates the impact of ν and σ1 on the relative loss

























The left panel in Fig. 7 indicates that, as capacity increases,
the relative loss in option value diminishes when Q < Q(1),
becomes zero for Q = Q(1), and increases if Q > Q(1). This
implies that increasing demand uncertainty raises (lowers) the
relative loss in option value when the amount of installed ca-
pacity is lower (greater) than the optimal one. By contrast, the
right panel indicates that greater likelihood of innovation lowers
the amount of installed capacity and reduces (increases) the
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Fig. 7. Relative loss in option value due to fixed capacity in Regime 1 for ν = 0.1 (left panel) and σ = 25% (right panel) and γ = 1 for both panels.
TABLE I
EFFECT OF INCREASING GROWTH RATE OF REGIME 3 ON THE OPTIMAL
INVESTMENTS/EXIT THRESHOLDS AND ASSOCIATED CAPACITIES
relative loss in option value when the size of the project is lower
(greater) than the optimal level. This result reveals an important
implication of managerial discretion over project scale, since it
implies that investment within industries, which are likely to be
disrupted may benefit from a more conservative strategy.
By investigating the effect of μ3 on the optimal investment
thresholds and corresponding quantities in Table I, we can gain
insight on how firms should adjust their optimal strategy. Al-
though we find that greater growth rate in the innovative market
induces earlier investment, we do not observe a smaller capacity
as in [19]. This is because the firm hastens the transition by aban-
doning earlier instead of investing earlier. Finally, the impact
of increasing market growth in Regime 3 seems negligible on
the initial capacity and investment threshold. This is a common
result for sequential investments [14] and stems from the ability
to consider sequential investments myopically.
VI. CONCLUSION
The increasing frequency of technological innovations indi-
cates that the developing world reflects a rapid-growing market
rather than just a low-cost manufacturing base. Within this con-
text, the viability of private firms relies crucially on investment
strategies that are responsive to market conditions. Therefore,
we develop a utility-based regime-switching framework in order
to analyze how technological and demand uncertainties interact
with attitudes toward risk to impact the decision to abandon an
existing market regime in order to enter a new one. Thus, the
contribution of this article was to provide an insights on the effect
of managerial discretion in the light of interacting uncertainties.
Specifically, by characterizing firms’ expectations under risk
aversion and incorporating them into a decision-support tool for
sequential investment and abandonment, we provide insights on
how discretion over investment timing and project scale can be
used to manage risk exposure associated with the transition out
of a disrupted industry. Such insights tend to be absent from
the long-term economic models that support policy initiatives,
yet failure to understand these properly raises the likelihood of
cycles of under- or overinvestment and the cost of the associated
corrective actions.
Results indicate that managerial discretion, risk aversion, and
market regime asymmetry, in terms of growth assumptions and
economic uncertainty, can have a crucial impact on the decision
to give up an existing mature regime in order to enter a new,
possibly riskier, yet more profitable one. We find that both
risk aversion and price sensitivity to project scale deter a bold
entry to a new market, significantly. Indeed, we show that risk
aversion accelerates investment by raising the incentive build a
smaller project in order to reduce exposure to downside risk.
Also, greater price sensitivity to project scale lowers the amount
of installed capacity and, thus, decreases both the exposure to
downside risk and the incentive to abandon an existing market
regime more easily. Furthermore, we find that greater demand
uncertainty in the existing (new) regime lowers (raises) the
incentive to abandon the existing regime in order to invest in
the new one. Finally, we show how the relative loss in project
value in the absence of discretion over project scale is affected by
demand and technological uncertainty and how it may decrease
as an innovation becomes more likely.
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In terms of future research, our framework can be extended
to account not only for the rapid pace of innovation and techno-
logical obsolescence, but also for the increasingly competitive
environment in which technological innovations emerge. Conse-
quently, future work should consider the impact of competition
on not only the optimal investment and capacity sizing decisions
[23], but also the optimal technology-adoption strategy [9], [17],
[18], [34]. This will enable the further investigation of important
interactions among opposing forces reflected in pre-emption,
risk aversion, and economic uncertainty. Moreover, the impact
of regime dependent η could be discussed in such a setting. In
addition, the option to make a gradual transition from the old to
the new market regime instead of a direct abandonment of the
old regime may also be considered within the same framework.
Finally, the real options framework presented in this article may
also be reformulated in terms of Bayesian analysis in order to
allow for sequential experimentation that provides information
about the true profitability of a new technology, thereby inform-
ing irreversible investment in technological innovations with a
regime-switching framework.
APPENDIX
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(ρ+ ν1k=1) (γ − β1k) (γ − β2k)
and 1k=1 is an indicator function, while βjk are the roots
of the quadratic 12σ
2
kβ(β − 1) + μkβ − (ρ+ ν1k=1) = 0, j =
1, 2 and k = 1, 2, 3.
Proof: The differential equation governing the value function
Φ
(k)
1 (·) is indicated in (A1). The first term on the left-hand side
is the utility of the immediate cash flow and the second term is

















1 (Θ + dΘ)
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1− ηQ(k))Q(k)) dt+ e−ρdtEΘ[
Φ
(k)
1 (Θ + dΘ)
]
=0, k = 2, 3
. (A1)
In order to assess the value of a profit stream in the cur-
rent regime, we let Φ(k+1)1 (Θ) = 0, and using Itô’s lemma,
we can expand the expressions in (A1) to obtain (A2), and



























We conjecture thatΦ(k)1 (Θ) = A(k)Θγ , whereA(k) is a constant
to be determined. Substituting this expression into (A2) yields[
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Proposition 2: Under a HARA utility function, the optimal














Proof: By applying the FONC to the unconstrained optimiza-









































By solving for Θ(3)τ1 , we obtain (13). Next, we insert (13) for Θ
in the expression for optimal capacity indicated in (11), which
yields (14). 
Proposition 3: The objective function F (3)1 (·) is strictly con-
cave at Θ(3)τ1 iff γ < β13.
Proof: The SOSC requires that the objective function is
concave at the critical threshold Θ(3)τ1 . Hence, we first need to
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< 0. Substituting for Θ(3)τ1 ,







1− ηQ(3))Q(3) (1− ηQ(3))Q(3)
]γ
× (β13(β13 + 1)− 2β13γ + γ(γ − 1))













< 0 ⇔ γ(γ − β13) < 0 (A8)
which holds for γ < β13. Note that β13 > 1 and, therefore, the
objective function is strictly concave for values of γ that imply
not only risk-averse by also risk-seeking behavior. 
Proposition 4: Greater risk aversion lowers the optimal ca-
pacity and decreases the required investment threshold.




















































1 ≥ 0 ⇔
⎛
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Hence, we consider the expression (− 1(β23−γ) −
log(1− γβ23 )
γ ).
Note that as γ → ∞, the expression tends toward 0. Next, we
investigate γ → 0 by using L’Hôspital’s rule on the second term






which is exactly offset by the limit of the first term. Furthermore,
we have verified that for the considered parameter ranges that
the inequality holds.
Proposition 5: Greater demand uncertainty raises the optimal
capacity and increases the required investment threshold.






















Consequently, the result follows since ∂β13∂σ3 < 0. Next, we con-
















Taking the partial derivative ofΘ(3)τ1 with respect toσ3 and noting
that β13 > 1 and
∂β23
∂σ3
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